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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/SE  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2016

TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU UN CD ER NG LY

SUBJECT: FUR LEADER WARNS OF WORSENING CRISIS

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with CDA Hume, Fur leader Abdulgasssem Seif El Din described the disintegrating social fabric in Darfur, his unsuccessful efforts to unite the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories in order to strengthen their bargaining position with the government, the growing disaffection within Darfur's population toward rebel leaders, and the detrimental effect of outside forces on the crisis. He also warned of growing support in Darfur for independence from Sudan and the prospect of the systematic killing of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by Arab militias. End summary.

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Social Disintegration to Independence Movement?  
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¶2. (C) In a November 16 meeting with CDA Hume, Abdulgasssem Seif El Din, the former father-in-law of SLM leader Abdulwahid Al Nur, attributed the "complete disintegration of the social fabric" in Darfur to the absence of an effective security force. He said that as Darfur had been forcibly integrated into Sudan in the last century, its population had never been made to feel "truly Sudanese." Seif Al Din said that the Darfurians believed that the Sudanese government was interested only in the land, not the region's people, and that without an effective international peacekeeping force, the conflict would shift to a war for Darfurian independence.

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Loss of Faith in Rebels  
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¶3. (C) Seif El Din noted that the people of Darfur were losing confidence in the armed rebel movements because they have not seriously pursued the major points that had formed the basis of their rejection of the DPA, such as compensation and Janjaweed disarmament. He characterized the rebel leaders as "stubborn young men who think they're going to be the emperor of Sudan" and dismissed their public statements as "only good wishes and slogans." El Nur had spent two months in late summer 2006 in Asmara attempting to convince Abdulwahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi, another SLM leader, to overcome their differences and present a united negotiating front to the Sudanese government. Describing his ultimate failure in this regard, El Nur said, "I was discussing with stones, not human beings."

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Outside Interference  
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¶4. (C) Seif El Din described two categories of "outside forces," which contributed to the worsening of the Darfur crisis. The first was an alliance of Arabs from Northern Darfur with those of Niger, Chad, and Libya -- supported by elements within the Sudanese government. The second was Popular Congress Party (PCP) leader Hassan al Turabi's attempts to use the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the National Redemption Front (NRF) as a means to return himself to power by fomenting disunity within the Darfurian rebel movements and destabilizing the current National Congress Party (NCP) regime.

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Threat to IDPs  
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¶5. (C) Finally, Seif El Din warned of the increasing probability that Sudanese government-sponsored Arab militias would begin to kill large numbers of IDPs throughout Darfur. He noted recent attacks in northwestern Darfur near Sirba over the last two weeks but provided few details. (Note: According to separate DLO reporting, a November 11 attack on the village of Sirba left an estimated 30 dead and between 18 and 40 wounded. On November 13, Janjaweed and Sudanese government forces blocked an African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) investigative patrol from entering Sirba. End note.)

¶6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.  
HUME